Monday, December 22, 2008

Pain Is Greater if Harm Seems Intentional


December 23, 2008
Vital Signs
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/23/health/23beha.html?_r=1&partner=rss&pagewanted=print

Behavior: Pain Is Greater if Harm Seems Intentional

It hurts plenty when someone, say, bonks you on the head with a badminton racket. But it hurts even more, researchers have found, if you think the bonking was no accident.

Earlier studies have found that the perception of pain can change with how it is experienced. That is why giving people sugar pills and saying they are medicine can make them feel better, the researchers note.

But in this case, the perception made the pain worse, the researchers report in the current issue of Psychological Science. The authors are Kurt Gray, a Harvard graduate student, and Daniel M. Wegner, a psychology professor.

For the study, the researchers told more than 40 volunteers that they were going to do a series of tasks, including color matching, number estimation and “discomfort assessment.” This last task involved their receiving a brief electric shock to the wrist.

They were told that a partner, sitting in another room, would choose which task they would do, and a computer screen alerted them to their partner’s choice.

In some cases, the volunteers were told their partner had chosen the pain tolerance test. In others, they were told the computers would select the pain tolerance test regardless of their partner’s choice.

When volunteers were under the impression that their partners were inflicting the shocks on them on purpose, they rated them as more painful, even though they were the same.

Friday, December 19, 2008

The end of the hedge fund?

Sebastian Mallaby
The Washington Post
December 18, 2008


For sheer toe-curling embarrassment, it may be a while before Wall Street does better than the Bernard Madoff scandal. Here was a rogue who practically telegraphed his unreliability by hiring a tiny, no-name audit firm, by reporting monthly investment results that never fluctuated and by claiming a trading strategy that could not possibly have been implemented given the billions of dollars he managed. And yet, despite these warnings, the rich, the famous and the supposedly sophisticated entrusted their money to Madoff, who defrauded them with the most laughably crude of methods — an old-fashioned Ponzi scam.

The question this prompts is not really about regulation, though some argue otherwise. Even if you define Madoff’s investment outfit as a hedge fund, which for various reasons is debatable, there’s nothing in this saga that supports clamping down on the industry.

Those who favor regulation of hedge funds start by insisting that they must register with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Well, Madoff had registered with the SEC voluntarily, and a fat lot of good it did. Those who support regulation also say that hedge funds should disclose more of what they do. Well, Madoff did make some disclosures; it’s just that they weren’t true. As SEC Chairman Chris Cox has all but admitted, the scandal doesn’t show that his agency lacked the power to regulate; it shows that it failed to exercise it. Responding to this scandal with more regulation would be like thrusting more pills on a patient who refuses medication.

The real question posed by this episode concerns the market’s response. Madoff illustrates a problem with investment outfits that claim to have some special sauce that is too valuable to discuss. People who entrusted their money to Madoff thought he had a clever options trading strategy; they were wrong. Worse, people who entrusted their money to respected banks and investment advisers had no idea that their savings were being passed out the back door to Madoff. On Monday, I happened to be visiting one of the most famous traders in Manhattan. He had invested with a hedge fund that had in turn invested with Madoff, hot-potato style.

The good news is that Madoff’s fraud was so brazen that any future imitators may be spotted. A newly chastened wealth management industry will be warier of people who hire bucket-shop auditors; the “fund of funds” industry, which gets paid to do due diligence on hedge funds, will feel appropriate pressure to redouble its efforts. Even though hedge fund managers may legitimately refuse to disclose their trading strategies, there are some things they can be open about. Do they trade through a respected external broker? (Madoff apparently didn’t.) If their returns clock in at 1 percent per month with eerie consistency, can they explain why? (Madoff could not have.)

But the bad news is that less-brazen fraudsters may be impossible to detect. As the economists Dean Foster and H. Peyton Young have elegantly demonstrated, hedge funds can fake brilliance by taking a small risk of implosion, and since implosion would hurt them less than their customers, some will rationally decide that faking is the way to go. A fund can take in $100, stick it in the S&P 500 index, then earn, say, $5 by selling options to people who want to insure themselves against a market collapse. If the collapse occurs, the hedge fund’s value will go to zero. But, over a five- or even 10-year time frame, the odds are good that a collapse won’t happen. So each year the fund manager will beat the S&P 500 index by 5 percentage points. He will be hailed as a genius.

Foster and Young suggest that this Achilles’ heel could eventually kill hedge funds. Because it is possible to commit undetected fraud, the industry will attract fraudsters; eventually, investors will realize that they can’t tell the good guys from the bad and yank their money out. If this is going to happen, the Madoff scandal could be the catalyst, especially because it has hit at a time when hedge funds are in trouble for other reasons. Hedge fund strategies depend on borrowing, or “leverage,” which is hard to come by now. They often depend on “shorting” stocks — that is, betting that they’ll fall in value — but regulators have restricted that practice. Even before the Madoff scandal, there were estimates that hedge fund assets might shrink from just under $2 trillion a few months ago to perhaps $1.4 trillion.

But it would be wrong to count the hedge funds out. Perhaps half of all funds use strategies about which there is no great secret, so disclosure is possible: The Foster-Young argument does not cut so sharply here. The other half can find ways to signal their honesty without disclosing their tactics: The most obvious is for managers to keep a serious amount of their own money in their funds. Good hedge funds really do know how to make money out of market inefficiencies. After the past 18 months of mayhem, it should be painfully obvious that there is plenty of inefficiency around.

SEBASTIAN MALLABY is a fellow for International Economics with the Council on Foreign Relations.

NYC Man Charged With Insider Trading Scam - Dec 08

New York (HedgeCo.Net) - Former Lehman salesman Matthew Devlin was charged on Thursday with participating in an insider trading scheme, after the New York City resident tipped off friends about 13 soon-to-be mergers. According to the complaint, Devlin got the information from his wife Nina, a public relations executive.

James J. Benjamin Jr., who is a lawyer for Nina said that she was “completely unaware that confidential information about her job was being used as the basis for securities trading. She is devastated by this terrible situation.” Nina is employed by the firm Brunswick Group, and was not charged in the case.

Miami Beach day traders Jamil Bouchareb and Daniel Corbin, however, were among those charged, in addition to fellow former Lehman employee Frederick Bowers and a New York City attorney Eric Holzer. They were arrested yesterday and charged with securities fraud and conspiracy.

In addition to the criminal charges, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed its own complaints yesterday against the same alleged ring which included seven individuals and two companies, stating that they made more than $4.8 million in illegal profits dating back to March 2004.

The SEC also alleges that Devlin, who was referred to by some traders as the “golden goose,” was given cash and other luxury items in exchange for the valued information.

Julie Scuderi
Senior Editor for HedgeCo.Net
Email: julie@hedgeco.net

Affluents Anonymous

HedgeCoNet - 2008 Dec 20 – Affluents Anonymous
http://bit.ly/7Nk


RICH PICKINGS: Affluents anonymous
By James Thomson


As the holiday season settles in, a sombre mood is descending on mansions from Melbourne to Mumbai, from Mayfair to Manhattan, from Monte Carlo to Moscow.

As we have documented throughout 2008, this has been an ugly year for the world’s wealthiest entrepreneurs. Tumbling share prices, lost bonuses, corporate collapses, plummeting house prices – the relentless bad news doesn’t just hurt a wealthy person’s corporeal self, it can damage their very psyche.

You probably don’t have much concern for the mental well-being of the rich – let them cry themselves to sleep on their giant pillows of money, I hear you say. But provision of specialist psychological services for wealthy investors has grown strongly over the last decade, in line with the entire wealth management industry.

Before 2007, the challenge for professionals working in this field was helping the wealthy deal with the enormous piles of money they had made, often extremely quickly.

In the last few months, the focus has switched to helping the rich cope with loss – of money, and identity.

Dr Hugh Joffe, a clinical psychologist based in the leafy Sydney suburb of Vaucluse, regularly consults to wealthy individuals.

He says the speed with which the downturn has torn through global financial markets has been, for many of his wealthy clients, particularly hard to deal with. After 15 years of watching the economy grow and their fortunes rise, Joffe’s clients have been forced to face up to a new reality.

“People had an illusion of certainty, and that’s all been taken away,” Joffe says.

While sweeping generalisations about the inner workings of a group of people’s minds are dangerous, it’s pretty safe to say that most entrepreneurs are extremely driven people.

While money might not be their primary driver – the thrill of building a business or leading a team or creating new product may motivate certain individuals – the size of your fortune does provide a basic measure of success. And besides, the notion of wealth remains closely tied to power, security, freedom, success, prestige and, for many people, happiness.

So how are the wealthy dealing with the psychological scarring from this downturn?

Psychologists and therapists are one way to go, but an increasingly popular option for high-net-worth individuals in the United States is “wealth peering” – a sort of group therapy for the rich that has been compared with Alcoholics Anonymous.

There are several organisations running wealth peering in the US, including Tiger 21, CCC Alliance and Family Office Exchange. Laird Pendleton, co-founder of CCC Alliance, told Dow Jones recently that the level of interest from prospective members during the past two months has been two to three times greater than usual.

Tiger 21, which describes itself as the premier wealth peering organisation in America, has 170 members who meet in 10 to 12 person groups. Membership fees are $44,000 a year and members must have at least $US10 million to gain admission. Tiger 21 has seven offices across the US and plans for six more next year. The organisation even claims to have fielded inquiries from Australia in recent months.

The peer-to-peer groups usually meet once a month and are also able to attend special presentations on investing, lifestyle, family and economics. More recently Tiger 21 has started holding bi-weekly conference calls for members, to discuss issues such as the state of the hedge fund market, the best places to park cash in the falling market and the potential impact of threats to hedge funds.

Tiger 21 co-founder and chairman Michael Sonnenfeldt says the conference calls have quickly become the most popular venue for members, with 50 to 70 members sharing their informed financial crisis views and experiences.

“This has been especially helpful at the time when most high-net-worth individuals are evaluating their portfolios and those who manage them,” he says. “These calls, along with our private web forums, and the monthly meetings, are often the only places where are our members can come for unbiased advice – advice from peers with the sole agenda of sharing personal insights and knowledge – and even opportunities.”

Another thing that makes Tiger 21 unique is the once-a-year “portfolio defence” sessions that each member is required to go through. The sessions involve the member presenting the personal investment portfolios to the group for an in-depth review.

“Financial results are presented in writing, and the presenting member will need to “defend” the stated objectives and demonstrate how the portfolio’s composition and performance reflect these objectives,” the Tiger 21 website says.

The idea is the member can then “harness the collective intelligence of the group by identifying potential problems or opportunities”.

Given the extraordinary events of the last year, it’s a fair bet that these portfolio defence sessions would involve a fair deal of collective soul-searching.

On Wall Street, Bonuses, Not Profits, Were Real

The New York Times

December 18, 2008
The Reckoning

On Wall Street, Bonuses, Not Profits, Were Real

“As a result of the extraordinary growth at Merrill during my tenure as C.E.O., the board saw fit to increase my compensation each year.”

E. Stanley O’Neal, the former chief executive of Merrill Lynch, March 2008

For Dow Kim, 2006 was a very good year. While his salary at Merrill Lynch was $350,000, his total compensation was 100 times that — $35 million.

The difference between the two amounts was his bonus, a rich reward for the robust earnings made by the traders he oversaw in Merrill’s mortgage business.

Mr. Kim’s colleagues, not only at his level, but far down the ranks, also pocketed large paychecks. In all, Merrill handed out $5 billion to $6 billion in bonuses that year. A 20-something analyst with a base salary of $130,000 collected a bonus of $250,000. And a 30-something trader with a $180,000 salary got $5 million.

But Merrill’s record earnings in 2006 — $7.5 billion — turned out to be a mirage. The company has since lost three times that amount, largely because the mortgage investments that supposedly had powered some of those profits plunged in value.

Unlike the earnings, however, the bonuses have not been reversed.

As regulators and shareholders sift through the rubble of the financial crisis, questions are being asked about what role lavish bonuses played in the debacle. Scrutiny over pay is intensifying as banks like Merrill prepare to dole out bonuses even after they have had to be propped up with billions of dollars of taxpayers’ money. While bonuses are expected to be half of what they were a year ago, some bankers could still collect millions of dollars.

Critics say bonuses never should have been so big in the first place, because they were based on ephemeral earnings. These people contend that Wall Street’s pay structure, in which bonuses are based on short-term profits, encouraged employees to act like gamblers at a casino — and let them collect their winnings while the roulette wheel was still spinning.

“Compensation was flawed top to bottom,” said Lucian A. Bebchuk, a professor at Harvard Law School and an expert on compensation. “The whole organization was responding to distorted incentives.”

Even Wall Streeters concede they were dazzled by the money. To earn bigger bonuses, many traders ignored or played down the risks they took until their bonuses were paid. Their bosses often turned a blind eye because it was in their interest as well.

“That’s a call that senior management or risk management should question, but of course their pay was tied to it too,” said Brian Lin, a former mortgage trader at Merrill Lynch.

The highest-ranking executives at four firms have agreed under pressure to go without their bonuses, including John A. Thain, who initially wanted a bonus this year since he joined Merrill Lynch as chief executive after its ill-fated mortgage bets were made. And four former executives at one hard-hit bank, UBS of Switzerland, recently volunteered to return some of the bonuses they were paid before the financial crisis. But few think others on Wall Street will follow that lead.

For now, most banks are looking forward rather than backward. Morgan Stanley and UBS are attaching new strings to bonuses, allowing them to pull back part of workers’ payouts if they turn out to have been based on illusory profits. Those policies, had they been in place in recent years, might have clawed back hundreds of millions of dollars of compensation paid out in 2006 to employees at all levels, including senior executives who are still at those banks.

A Bonus Bonanza

For Wall Street, much of this decade represented a new Gilded Age. Salaries were merely play money — a pittance compared to bonuses. Bonus season became an annual celebration of the riches to be had in the markets. That was especially so in the New York area, where nearly $1 out of every $4 that companies paid employees last year went to someone in the financial industry. Bankers celebrated with five-figure dinners, vied to outspend each other at charity auctions and spent their newfound fortunes on new homes, cars and art.

The bonanza redefined success for an entire generation. Graduates of top universities sought their fortunes in banking, rather than in careers like medicine, engineering or teaching. Wall Street worked its rookies hard, but it held out the promise of rich rewards. In college dorms, tales of 30-year-olds pulling down $5 million a year were legion.

While top executives received the biggest bonuses, what is striking is how many employees throughout the ranks took home large paychecks. On Wall Street, the first goal was to make “a buck” — a million dollars. More than 100 people in Merrill’s bond unit alone broke the million-dollar mark in 2006. Goldman Sachs paid more than $20 million apiece to more than 50 people that year, according to a person familiar with the matter. Goldman declined to comment.

Pay was tied to profit, and profit to the easy, borrowed money that could be invested in markets like mortgage securities. As the financial industry’s role in the economy grew, workers’ pay ballooned, leaping sixfold since 1975, nearly twice as much as the increase in pay for the average American worker.

“The financial services industry was in a bubble," said Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Economy.com. “The industry got a bigger share of the economic pie.”

A Money Machine

Dow Kim stepped into this milieu in the mid-1980s, fresh from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. Born in Seoul and raised there and in Singapore, Mr. Kim moved to the United States at 16 to attend Phillips Academy in Andover, Mass. A quiet workaholic in an industry of workaholics, he seemed to rise through the ranks by sheer will. After a stint trading bonds in Tokyo, he moved to New York to oversee Merrill’s fixed-income business in 2001. Two years later, he became co-president.

Even as tremors began to reverberate through the housing market and his own company, Mr. Kim exuded optimism.

After several of his key deputies left the firm in the summer of 2006, he appointed a former colleague from Asia, Osman Semerci, as his deputy, and beneath Mr. Semerci he installed Dale M. Lattanzio and Douglas J. Mallach. Mr. Lattanzio promptly purchased a $5 million home, as well as oceanfront property in Mantoloking, a wealthy enclave in New Jersey, according to county records.

Merrill and the executives in this article declined to comment or say whether they would return past bonuses. Mr. Mallach did not return telephone calls.

Mr. Semerci, Mr. Lattanzio and Mr. Mallach joined Mr. Kim as Merrill entered a new phase in its mortgage buildup. That September, the bank spent $1.3 billion to buy the First Franklin Financial Corporation, a mortgage lender in California, in part so it could bundle its mortgages into lucrative bonds.

Yet Mr. Kim was growing restless. That same month, he told E. Stanley O’Neal, Merrill’s chief executive, that he was considering starting his own hedge fund. His traders were stunned. But Mr. O’Neal persuaded Mr. Kim to stay, assuring him that the future was bright for Merrill’s mortgage business, and, by extension, for Mr. Kim.

Mr. Kim stepped to the lectern on the bond trading floor and told his anxious traders that he was not going anywhere, and that business was looking up, according to four former employees who were there. The traders erupted in applause.

“No one wanted to stop this thing,” said former mortgage analyst at Merrill. “It was a machine, and we all knew it was going to be a very, very good year.”

Merrill Lynch celebrated its success even before the year was over. In November, the company hosted a three-day golf tournament at Pebble Beach, Calif.

Mr. Kim, an avid golfer, played alongside William H. Gross, a founder of Pimco, the big bond house; and Ralph R. Cioffi, who oversaw two Bear Stearns hedge funds whose subsequent collapse in 2007 would send shock waves through the financial world.

“There didn’t seem to be an end in sight,” said a person who attended the tournament.

Back in New York, Mr. Kim’s team was eagerly bundling risky home mortgages into bonds. One of the last deals they put together that year was called “Costa Bella,” or beautiful coast — a name that recalls Pebble Beach. The $500 million bundle of loans, a type of investment known as a collateralized debt obligation, was managed by Mr. Gross’s Pimco.

Merrill Lynch collected about $5 million in fees for concocting Costa Bella, which included mortgages originated by First Franklin.

But Costa Bella, like so many other C.D.O.’s, was filled with loans that borrowers could not repay. Initially part of it was rated AAA, but Costa Bella is now deeply troubled. The losses on the investment far exceed the money Merrill collected for putting the deal together.

So Much for So Few

By the time Costa Bella ran into trouble, the Merrill bankers who had devised it had collected their bonuses for 2006. Mr. Kim’s fixed-income unit generated more than half of Merrill’s revenue that year, according to people with direct knowledge of the matter. As a reward, Mr. O’Neal and Mr. Kim paid nearly a third of Merrill’s $5 billion to $6 billion bonus pool to the 2,000 professionals in the division.

Mr. O’Neal himself was paid $46 million, according to Equilar, an executive compensation research firm and data provider in California. Mr. Kim received $35 million. About 57 percent of their pay was in stock, which would lose much of its value over the next two years, but even the cash portions of their bonus were generous: $18.5 million for Mr. O’Neal, and $14.5 million for Mr. Kim, according to Equilar.

Mr. Kim and his deputies were given wide discretion about how to dole out their pot of money. Mr. Semerci was among the highest earners in 2006, at more than $20 million. Below him, Mr. Mallach and Mr. Lattanzio each earned more than $10 million. They were among just over 100 people who accounted for some $500 million of the pool, according to people with direct knowledge of the matter.

After that blowout, Merrill pushed even deeper into the mortgage business, despite growing signs that the housing bubble was starting to burst. That decision proved disastrous. As the problems in the subprime mortgage market exploded into a full-blown crisis, the value of Merrill’s investments plummeted. The firm has since written down its investments by more than $54 billion, selling some of them for pennies on the dollar.

Mr. Lin, the former Merrill trader, arrived late to the party. He was one of the last people hired onto Merrill’s mortgage desk, in the summer of 2007. Even then, Merrill guaranteed Mr. Lin a bonus if he joined the firm. Mr. Lin would not disclose his bonus, but such payouts were often in the seven figures.

Mr. Lin said he quickly noticed that traders across Wall Street were reluctant to admit what now seems so obvious: Their mortgage investments were worth far less than they had thought.

“It’s always human nature,” said Mr. Lin, who lost his job at Merrill last summer and now works at RRMS Advisors, a consulting firm that advises investors in troubled mortgage investments. “You want to pull for the market to do well because you’re vested.”

But critics question why Wall Street embraced the risky deals even as the housing and mortgage markets began to weaken.

“What happened to their investments was of no interest to them, because they would already be paid,” said Paul Hodgson, senior research associate at the Corporate Library, a shareholder activist group. Some Wall Street executives argue that paying a larger portion of bonuses in the form of stock, rather than in cash, might keep employees from making short-sighted decision. But Mr. Hodgson contended that would not go far enough, in part because the cash rewards alone were so high. Mr. Kim, for example, was paid a total of $116.6 million in cash and stock from 2001 to 2007. Of that, $55 million was in cash, according to Equilar.

Leaving the Scene

As the damage at Merrill became clear in 2007, Mr. Kim, his deputies and finally Mr. O’Neal left the firm. Mr. Kim opened a hedge fund, but it quickly closed. Mr. Semerci and Mr. Lattanzio landed at a hedge fund in London.

All three departed without collecting bonuses in 2007. Mr. O’Neal, however, got even richer by leaving Merrill Lynch. He was awarded an exit package worth $161 million.

Clawing back the 2006 bonuses at Merrill would not come close to making up for the company’s losses, which exceed all the profits that the firm earned over the previous 20 years. This fall, the once-proud firm was sold to Bank of America, ending its 94-year history as an independent firm.

Mr. Bebchuk of Harvard Law School said investment banks like Merrill were brought to their knees because their employees chased after the rich rewards that executives promised them.

“They were trying to get as much of this or that paper, they were doing it with excitement and vigor, and that was because they knew they would be making huge amounts of money by the end of the year,” he said.

Ben White contributed reporting.

Monday, December 15, 2008

Hedge Fund Tracking: Thiel's Clarium Capital, Q3 2008

November 18, 2008
http://seekingalpha.com/article/106561-hedge-fund-tracking-thiel-s-clarium-capital-q3-2008

The second fund in the 3rd quarter edition of our 2008 hedge fund tracking series is Clarium Capital Management, LLC. Clarium is a $6 billion global macro hedge fund run by Peter Thiel, the co-founder of PayPal. 2008 has been a roller coaster year for Thiel and company. Earlier in the year, they were up over 45%. But, as market volatility increased, they began to give back their gains and now find themselves -2.8% for the year. This was in part due to a rough October, in which they were down 18% for the month, in part due to their recent shift into equities.

Assets under management had recently ballooned to the highest amount in Clarium's history and it will be interesting to see how effective Clarium will be at deploying this new capital going forward. Before reading this quarter's update, you might be interested in reading our coverage of Clarium's 2nd quarter portfolio holdings. And, to those who want a little more background on Thiel & his investment style, we first wrote about him here.

So, now that we've got a background on Thiel and Clarium, let's take a quick look at his portfolio highlights. Keep in mind that this is merely a brief summary of Clarium's top holdings. Due to the time sensitive nature of the 13F material, we wanted to get this information posted as soon as possible. The following were Clarium's holdings as of September 30th, 2008 as filed with the SEC.

New Positions (Brand new positions that Clarium initiated in the last quarter):
PIMCO Municipal Income Fund (PMF)
Oracle (ORCL)
PIMCO Floating Rate Strategy Fund (PFN)
Iron Mountain Incorporated (IRM)
Consolidated Edison (ED)
Kimberly-Clark Corporation (KMB)
T-3 Energy Services (TTES)
Natus Medical (BABY)
National Municipal Bond Fund (MUB)
United States Oil Fund (USO)
ishares Brazil ETF (EWZ)
Interval Leisure Group (IILG)
Exxon Mobil (XOM)
Mastercard (MA)
United States Natural Gas Fund (UNG)
Microsoft (MSFT)
Yahoo (YHOO)
Google (GOOG)
Financial Select Sector ETF (XLF)

Removed Positions (Positions Clarium sold out of completely last quarter):
Cabot Oil & Gas (COG)
Petroleo Brasileiro (PBR)
Honeywell (HON)
ITT Corporation (ITT)
Aircastle Limited (AYR)
Frontier Oil (FTO)
Marathon Oil (MRO)
ONEOK (OKE)
Royal Caribbean (RCL)
Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.B)
Foster Wheeler (FWLT)
Nucor (NUE)
Pinnacle Airlines (PNCL)
Sothebys (BID)
Black & Decker (BDK)

Top 20 Holdings (based on % of portfolio):

  1. Financial Select Sector ETF (XLF): 38.5% of portfolio
  2. Google (GOOG): 28.8% of portfolio
  3. Yahoo (YHOO): 28.7% of portfolio
  4. Hewlett Packard (HPQ): 0.4% of portfolio
  5. Microsoft (MSFT): 0.3% of portfolio
  6. McDonalds (MCD): 0.3% of portfolio
  7. Procter & Gamble (PG): 0.3% of portfolio
  8. Burlington Northern (BNI): 0.27% of portfolio
  9. Philip Morris International (PM): 0.27% of portfolio
  10. United States Natural Gas Fund (UNG): 0.1% of portfolio
  11. Mastercard (MA): 0.1% of portfolio
  12. Conoco Philips (COP): 0.1% of portfolio
  13. Fairfax Financial (FFH): 0.1% of portfolio
  14. Occidental Petroleum (OXY): 0.1% of portfolio
  15. Exxon Mobil (XOM): 0.1% of portfolio
  16. Schering Plough (SGP)
  17. Altria (MO)
  18. Interval Leisure Group (IILG)
  19. Canadian Superior Energy (SNG)
  20. NRG Energy (NRG)

First, we need to cover the odd construction of Clarium's portfolio, which may be puzzling some of you reading. Clarium employs a global macro strategy and therefore invests across multiple markets (commodities, currencies, debt, bonds, global markets, etc). And, due to the fact that SEC 13F filings only require equity holdings to be disclosed, we only get to see a small slice of their overall portfolio.

We track Clarium's equity holdings simply because Thiel is very intelligent and they could enter equity markets at any moment. For instance, in our 2nd quarter analysis of Clarium's holdings, we noted that they only had $93 million invested in equities as detailed in the filing. And, considering they had over $6 billion AUM (assets under management) at the time, the equities detailed in the filing were miniscule positions compared to their overall fund size.

But, as we recently noted, Clarium shifted to equities in late September. And thus, we see part of this reflected in the current 13F filing. In the 2nd quarter, they had $93 million invested in equities. But, this time around (3rd quarter), they had over $2.8 billion invested in equities.

This drastic jump in capital allocated to long positioned equities also helps to describe their lopsided portfolio. Keep in mind they also probably had equity short positions as well, which we cannot see. As you'll notice in the top 20 holdings listed above, the top 3 holdings make up a vast percentage (%) of the portfolio relative to their other positions. Those positions included: Financial select sector ETF (XLF), Google (GOOG), and Yahoo (YHOO).

Clarium definitely felt that the financials and specific tech names were vastly beaten down and due for a correction. The rest of the positions are small relative to their overall equity exposure at only 0.1%-0.3% of the equity portfolio. These smaller positions reflect the minimal equity exposure Clarium had in the quarter prior, where they were hardly invested in equities.

We will have to wait until next quarter to see whether or not Thiel was building up core positions in Google (GOOG) and Yahoo (YHOO), or simply trading them. We have a feeling though, that these position sizes will be reduced in size come next quarter. After all, they are a global macro fund and they will quickly allocate their money to the markets and positions they feel are poised to benefit. But, that is merely speculation on our part.

Keep in mind that we have not detailed every tiny maneuver they have made with their portfolio. In some of their holdings they added shares, and with others they sold some shares. We are essentially capturing the major moves Clarium has made over the past quarter with regards to their portfolio.

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Saturday, December 13, 2008

Risks of Transferring Risk

University of Chicago's Douglas Baird on the risks of transferring risk

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Crowell.gifSpeaking at Crowell & Moring LLPs Credit Default Swaps conference on Thursday, Douglas G. Baird, a professor of law at the University of Chicago, talked about the somewhat problematic nature of the derivatives.

"The big risk with credit default swaps is the big difference between the party that holds the risk and the party with control of the underlying asset," Baird said.

"If you come to a bank and tell them you're going to have to file bankruptcy tomorrow if you don't get a waiver, previously they would say, 'Let's work something out.'

"Now they aren't holding the risk; the issuer of the credit default swaps is," he continued. "So you're telling the bank that if they don't give you the waiver, they'll be paid off in full right away and never have to talk to you again."

Baird continued, saying that the situation hasn't reached that point because issuers are there helping to keep the bondholders in check, but that it is a real concern. - George White

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